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Classroom nudity' and hate speech regulations 2 are two much publicized
free speech issues that have arisen recently at the University of California at
Berkeley (hereinafter "U.C. Berkeley" or "University"). Both topics raise
important questions about the limits of tolerance for free expression at a large
public university, particularly one with a long tradition of free speech
activities, yet both deal with expression which many believe has little civic
value. Pleas to protect hate speech, for instance, often take the form of
arguments that if we do not protect speech and expression absolutely, we risk
jeopardizing speech on public policy, the speech which First Amendment
theory values most.3 Yet a greater threat to free speech on campus has gone
largely unnoticed. In Smith v. Regents of the University of California,4 the
California Supreme Court ruled that the use of mandatory activity fees to fund
political or ideological student groups at public universities violates the First
I. See, e.g., T. Christian Miller, 'Naked Guy' Plans a Return to Class-in the Nude, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 11, 1992, at A19. But see Peter Fimrite, Naked Guy Arrested in Berkeley Under New Public Nudity
Law, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 28, 1993, at B4.
2. The University of California at Berkeley Code of Student Conduct, Nov. 11, 1992, Part I.B.16. For
a discussion of the university tradition and hate speech codes, see Stephen C. Veltri, Free Speech in Free
Universities, 19 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 783 (1993), which includes references to many of the dozens of articles
and notes that have been written on this topic.
3. One prominent judicial and philosophical justification for protecting free speech is that free speech
facilitates representative democracy. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 998 (12th ed. 1991). A
leading proponent of this view is Alexander Meiklejohn. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). This view "tends to reserve the highest protection for
political speech." GUNTHER, supra, at 1001. Meiklejohn argued that political speech should receive the
highest level of First Amendment protection. MEIKLEJOHN, supra, at 24-25. For a criticism of Meiklejohn's
position, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 62 HARV. L. REv. 891 (1949) (book review) (challenging Meiklejohn's
argument that speech pertaining to self-government enjoys absolute protection under First Amendment).
For a contemporary argument that speech on public issues is central to the First Amendment, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Half Truths of the First Amendment, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F 25, 33 (suggesting that principal
current threat to freedom of expression is fact that our culture and economy produce very little speech on
public issues).
4. 844 P.2d 500 (Cal.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 181 (1993).
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Amendment. This decision will in fact severely diminish student speech on
issues of public concern at state universities.
University administrations typically have not considered the political
content of a student organization's speech in determining whether or not to
grant it funding.' Since the early 1970's, students have challenged activity fee
systems that funnel general fees to groups that individual fee payers find
offensive.6 Prior to Smith, courts consistently upheld such systems, basing their
decisions on factors such as university officials' discretion to determine which
activities warrant subsidization, the importance in higher education of learning
to tolerate speech and debate with one's opponents, and the idea that
universities foster a "marketplace of ideas" by providing "wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
tongues."' 7 Underpinning most of these decisions is a concept of the
university campus as a public forum for its students.
This Note argues that in Smith the California Supreme Court broke with
a tradition that permits universities to fund political student groups with
mandatory fees, and that it did so because it failed to appreciate the
relationship between the fee system and the creation of a public forum for
students' speech. If the campus is viewed as a public forum, not only is the fee
program which supports speech within the forum constitutional, but cutting off
"political" student groups from such support is unconstitutional. These two
propositions are intimately connected: The reason that the University does not
violate the First Amendment when it compels students to support on-campus
political speech is that the activity funding system, like campus grounds and
facilities, is a public forum; because the activity funding system is a public
forum, the University of California Regents (hereinafter "Regents") may not
discriminate against political groups in subsidizing speech within that forum.
If the Regents choose to subsidize speech within the public forum of the
campus, they must do so according to content-neutral criteria. Reciprocally, by
remaining neutral toward student speech within the forum, the University
avoids endorsing any particular group's political and ideological opinions and
thus avoids compelling speech in violation of the First Amendment.
3
5. A survey of 301 two-year and four-year private and public colleges, to which 217 institutions
responded, indicated that 70.3% of colleges that collected a student activity fee did not consider whether
student organizations were affiliated with political groups in determining whether they were eligible to
receive funds. The remaining 29.7% prevented groups affiliated with political groups from receiving funds
generated by mandatory activity fees. DAVID L. MEABON ET AL., STUDENT ACTIVITY FEES 20, 27, Table
8 (1979).
6. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of these cases.
7. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citation omitted).
8. The argument advanced in this Note would not apply to private colleges and universities because
the Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable only to government actions. The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883). Occasionally, courts have found that private parties have engaged in
"state action" and thus are bound by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 942 (1982). For a discussion of what factors courts consider in determining whether private
university actions constitute "state action," see Mindy A. Kaiden, Note, Albert v. Carovano, The Second
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Part I of this Note describes the Smith opinion, outlining the logic that led
the court to order the Regents to identify student groups whose objectives are
more political than educational and deny those groups access to funds
generated by mandatory fees. Part II discusses the mandatory fee doctrine on
which the court relied. It argues that the court should have asked whether or
not funding a wide range of student speech, including political speech, was
"germane" to the purpose of the activity fee program, rather than asking
whether particular student groups were more "political" than "educational." In
addition, Part II illustrates that in the past courts have found that support for
controversial speech on public matters, as part of public university programs
to support a campus forum in which a diversity of views are expressed, is
germane to the university's educational mission. Part III argues that because
the activity fee program's purpose was to support a public forum for students'
speech, the University could not constitutionally discriminate against political
and ideological speech in distributing funds for speech within that forum. Part
IV explores the impact the Smith court's order will have on the activity group
system and argues that discrimination against "political" and "ideological"
student speech amounts to discrimination against student organizations based
not only on the content but also on the viewpoint they express. Part V
concludes that, as long as public universities utilize a distribution system which
is itself content-neutral, they should be able to distribute funds generated from
mandatory activity fees to political and ideological student groups that
participate within the public forum of the campus.
I. THE SMITH DECISION
In Smith, the California Supreme Court ordered the Regents to restructure
the student activity fee system that had been in place at U.C. Berkeley since
1955. 9 For nearly forty years before Smith was decided, every student at U.C.
Berkeley had paid a mandatory activity fee to the Regents each semester. A
portion of the funds generated by this fee were transferred from the University
to the Associated Students of the University of California, Berkeley
(hereinafter "A.S.U.C."), a student association which finances student
government and student activity groups. Under the guidelines in place when
the system was challenged, any four U.C. Berkeley students could create an
activity group eligible for A.S.U.C. funding by registering with the University
Circuit Redefines Under Color of State Law for Private Universities, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 239 (1989). Tests
for whether a private party has engaged in "state action" and "acted under the color of state law" are
usually identical. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 928-32. For a discussion of various theories that courts have employed
in finding that action by a private university or college is "state action," see Richard Thigpen, The
Application of Fourteenth Amendment Norms to Private Colleges and Universities, II J.L. & EDUC. 171
(1982).
9. Smith, 844 P.2d at 504.
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and agreeing to comply with content-neutral regulations. Properly constituted
student activity groups could use funds they received from the A.S.U.C. for
defined activities.' ° The guidelines provided that the funds could be used for
purposes related to the University or beneficial to the student body, and could
not be used in connection with partisan political activities or ballot measures,
except to fund nonpartisan educational fora on issues of interest." In practice,
this meant that groups receiving money were allowed to take ideological
stands, but not to endorse political candidates or lobby for legislation.'
In 1979, the Pacific Legal Foundation filed a complaint in the California
Superior Court on behalf of four U.C. Berkeley students challenging the
Regents' power to collect mandatory fees and distribute them to student
organizations dedicated to political or ideological causes.' 3 The plaintiffs
claimed that the University had violated both the California and U.S.
Constitutions14 by providing mandatory student contributions to the following
groups: Amnesty International, Berkeley Students for Peace, Campus N.O.W.
(National Organization for Women), Campus Abortion Rights Action League,
East Bay Right to Life, Gay and Lesbian Union, Progressive Students
Organization, Radical Education and Action Project, Sparticus Youth League,
Students Against Intervention in El Salvador, Students for Economic
Democracy, Iranian Student Association, U.C. Berkeley Feminist Alliance and
Women Organized Against Sexual Harassment, U.C. Campus Sierra Club,
Conservation and Natural Resources Study Student Organization, and
Greenpeace Berkeley.'
5
The Smith court began its discussion by reviewing the Supreme Court's
First Amendment mandatory fee doctrine. This doctrine generally prohibits the
state from compelling an individual to fund political or ideological speech with
which he or she disagrees. An exception to this prohibition arises when the
10. Id. To obtain funds, the groups submitted a budget to the A.S.U.C. Finance Committee for review,
and the Finance Committee then forwarded the budget along with its recommendation to the A.S.U.C.
Senate for approval. If a group's budget was approved, it could receive reimbursement from the A.S.U.C.
for expenses incurred in running the organization. Expenses for which the student organization could
receive reimbursement were "(1) personal services, (2) stationery and supplies, (3) telephone, (4) travel,
(5) dues and subscriptions, (6) postage, (7) equipment rental, (8) advertising, (9) programs and printing,
(10) facilities rental, and (11) other." Id.
11. Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. Rptr. 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, S44 P.2d
500 (Cal.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 181 (1993).
12. Philip Hager, Justices Halt Some Uses of Mandatory Student Fees, L.A. TIwIEs, Feb. 4, 1993, at
A3, A19.
13. In 1980, 32 additional students joined the plaintiffs. Id.
14. Smith, 844 P.2d at 505.
15. Smith, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 266 n.4. The suits were consolidated, and in 1982 the superior court held
that U.C. Berkeley's fee system was constitutional. The California Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 275.
The California Supreme Court accepted the case for review, but deferred briefing pending release of the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), a case challenging the California
State Bar's practice of using mandatory fees to support political and ideological activities. The California
Supreme Court then remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Keller, and the Court of Appeals once
again affirmed the superior court's judgment. Smith, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 384 (Ct. App. 1992). The California
Supreme Court then granted review of the decision. Smith, 844 P.2d at 505.
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state can compel an individual to support an organization because the
organization serves a public function, and speech by the organization which the
individual incidentally supports is "germane" to that function.' 6 The question
before the Smith court was whether speech by political and ideological student
groups was sufficiently "germane" to the function served by the University to
fit within the exception.
The court rejected the University's argument that funding political student
groups is germane to the University's purpose because it educates students by
allowing them to express their views, participate in campus administration,
learn about governmental processes, develop social skills, inform the student
body about various issues, and ensure freedom of expression and
association. 17 The court dismissed the possibility that public forum doctrine
applied to the case, relegating that issue to a footnote.'" Rather than analyzing
the entire mandatory fee system as a means of promoting a forum for a wide
range of student speech, the court attacked the educational value of particular
groups that received funding. The court asserted that it is "obviously true...
that a group's dedication to achieving its political or ideological goals, at some
point, begins to outweigh any legitimate claim it may have to be educating
students on the University's behalf."' 9 Thus, the court reasoned, the
mandatory fees were being spent for political speech which, by definition, was
not germane to the public function served by the University. The court's
solution to what it perceived as a violation of the freedom not to fund speech
was to require the Regents to determine which student groups are more
ideological or political than educational, and to offer students the option of
deducting an amount corresponding to the percentage of the A.S.U.C. budget
that any of those groups would receive from the students' activity fees.2"
Under the Smith regime, groups branded "political" or "ideological" will
suffer. While the amounts of money at stake are not huge, student groups rely
on the money to carry out such projects as bringing speakers to campus,
renting meeting facilities, showing films, and printing literature for distribution
16. See discussion infra Part II.A for a description of this doctrine and the Smith court's treatment of
it.
17. Smith, 844 P.2d at 508.
18. Id. at 509 n.8.
19. Id. at 508.
20. Id. at 513. The court called for use of a procedure similar to those used by labor unions and bar
associations. Id. The University and A.S.U.C. sought review of the decision, but in October 1993, the
Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Smith, 114 S. Ct. 181 (1993).
Thus, the Regents must abide by the California Supreme Court order that they determine which groups are
more political or ideological than educational and offer students an opportunity to withhold funds from
those groups. The University of California President has issued Interim Guidelines to assist University of
California campuses in complying with Smith. The Guidelines would make groups that are "principally
dedicated to effecting political or ideological purposes, as distinguished from educational purposes such
as promoting discussion or debate from different perspectives," ineligible for funds generated by mandatory
activity fees. Interim Guidelines for Implementing the Requirements of Smith v. Regents, Part I (Nov. 4,
1993).
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to the student body. "Political" and "ideological" expressive activities will
decrease if student-run organizations must rely on voluntary donations from
fellow students for financial support of these activities. The decision flies in
the face of the campus' function as a forum for students and ignores "[t]he
principle underlying the expenditure of student body organization funds
collected through mandatory fees[-]that such expenditures shall be made in
programs that reflect the broadest variety of student interests and that are open
to all students who wish to participate.' 21 If the University were permitted to
distribute the money to student groups on a content-neutral basis, on the other
hand, it could properly assert that the mandatory fees were used to create a
public forum for diverse student speech. As will be argued, when a public
university funds political speech as part of a program in which funds for
speech are granted on a content-neutral basis to support a campus forum, the
university avoids the First Amendment evil of forced speech.22
II. MANDATORY FEE DOCTRINE
Contrary to the Smith court's averments, its decision did not proceed
logically from the Supreme Court's doctrine regarding the use of mandatory
fees to support political and ideological speech. This doctrine requires an
inquiry into the relationship between the funded speech and the recipient
organization's larger purpose. If the funded speech is germane to the function
served by the organization-that is, the function which justifies the government
compelling individuals to fund the organization in the first place-then the
organization may use compelled dues to fund the speech. Thus, in Smith, the
court should have asked whether the funding scheme as a whole was germane
to the government's neutral goal of creating a forum for student speech, not
whether individual student groups were primarily political. By narrowly
focusing on the political nature of the funded speech, the Smith court failed to
see the connection between the speech and the University's educational
purpose.
A. The "Germaneness" Test
In describing the mandatory fee doctrine, the Smith court discussed Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education23 and Keller v. State Bar24 at some length. Like
the student plaintiffs in Smith, dues-payers in Keller and Abood objected to
having the fees they were compelled to pay used to support speech with which
they disagreed. In Abood, a case in which non-union employees challenged a
21. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 42659 (1993).
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
24. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
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labor union's use of their mandatory union fees to fund political speech, the
Court recognized that a union's activities as an exclusive bargaining agent are,
to a certain extent, inherently ideological?5 For example, in negotiating health
benefits, a union cannot help but take a position as to how to treat abortion.26
Far from being unconstitutional forced speech, "such interference as exists is
constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important
contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by
Congress. 27 On the other hand, union contributions to political candidates or
to fund political speech were held to be similar to compelled affirmations of
belief in certain political opinions, an infringement on First Amendment
rights.2" The First Amendment thus prohibits unions "from requiring any of the
appellants to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may
oppose '29 if it is unrelated to the union's purpose for existing, that is,
collective bargaining.30 In Keller, the Court applied the same principles to a
challenge to a state bar's use of mandatory dues for political speech and held
that the functions for which mandatory fees could be used were limited to
those "in which the officials and members of the Bar are acting essentially as
professional advisors to those ultimately charged with the regulation of the
legal profession, 3' rather than taking positions on political issues.
Thus, using mandatory fees to fund political speech or activities is not per
se unconstitutional. Organizations can fund political or ideological speech with
the mandatory fees of dissenters as long as it is germane to the purpose that
justifies the compelled association.32 In cases involving labor unions courts
have recognized a range of activities, including political activity, as germane
to collective bargaining. Non-union employees can "be compelled to pay their
fair share of not only the direct costs of negotiating and administering a
collective-bargaining contract ... but also the expenses of activities or
undertakings ... reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties
25. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222. The union's collective bargaining agreement included an "agency-shop"
clause requiring every employee who was not a member of the union to pay a union service charge equal
to the regular dues required of union members. Id. at 212.
26. Id. at 26.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 234-36. The principle that the First Amendment includes a right against compelled speech
has been affirmed many times by the Court. See, e.g., West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (state may not compel students to salute flag).
29. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235.
30. Id. at 235-36.
31. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990).
32. In his concurrence to Abood, Powell emphasizes that speech must be both political or ideological
and not germane to the organization's purpose to be forbidden by mandatory fee doctrine: "In order to
vindicate his First Amendment rights in a union shop, the individual employee apparently must ... initiate
a proceeding to determine what part of the union's budget has been allocated to activities that are both
'ideological' and 'unrelated to collective bargaining."' Abood, 431 U.S. at 254-55 (emphasis added).
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of the union as exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining
unit. ,
3 3
Unions have been allowed to use mandatory fees for lobbying activities
when "pertinent to the duties of the union as a bargaining representative."
34
For example, in Robinson v. New Jersey, the Third Circuit held that a union
could lobby state legislators in regard to state regulation of such matters as
pensions, overtime, subcontracting, and health plans with nonmembers'
funds.35 As long as the lobbying is germane to the purpose which justified the
compelled association, it "has no different constitutional implication from any
other form of union activity that may be financed with representation fees. 36
Thus, non-union employees can be forced to subsidize it.
Far from being a litmus test for whether an activity is political or
nonideological, "germaneness" looks at the connection between the funded
activity and the organization's purpose. Thus, the Smith court should not have
ordered the Regents to cut off funding eligibility for all political groups before
carefully considering whether political speech was germane to the purpose of
the student activity program. As will be argued, distribution of funds to student
organizations which spoke on political and ideological issues was not only
"germane" but essential to the purpose that justified the mandatory dues:
creating a public forum for student speech.
B. Mandatory Funding of Political Student Speech Is Germane to the
Creation of a Forum for Student Speech
While ostensibly using a "germaneness" test to decide whether the
University could use mandatory funds to support political student speech,37
the Smith court failed to recognize that "germaneness" and purpose are
intricately connected. If the student activity group program serves a purpose
which is appropriate for the University to pursue, and funding political student
groups is germane to the purpose of the program, then use of the mandatory
activity fees to fund speech by political student organizations is constitutional.
33. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984). In Ellis, employees objected to an
agency-shop fee they were required to pay under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1988).
The Court was willing to recognize that activities other than formal bargaining, for instance attending
national union conventions, union social activities, and publishing portions of a union magazine that did
not discuss political issues, were all sufficiently related to collective bargaining to justify compelled
support. Id. at 448-51.
34. Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598, 609 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228 (1985).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The Smith court did acknowledge that "the state may compel a person to support an organization
if there is a sufficiently compelling reason to do so, and that the organization's use of mandatory
contributions must be germane to the purposes that justified the requirement of support." Smith, 844 P.2d
at 508.
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When deciding the constitutionality of student activity programs
resembling the one at U.C. Berkeley, other courts have recognized that the
purpose of mandatory student fees is to create a public forum for student
speech. These programs serve an educational purpose appropriate for an
institution of higher education. As one court stated, "[t]he fact that certain
ideas are controversial and wholly disagreed with does not automatically make
them non-educational. 38 While exposure to only a single point of view might
indoctrinate rather than educate, exposure to debate between opposing
viewpoints is educational and does not imply that a particular point of view is
correct.
Not only have programs to support diverse student speech been regarded
as educational, but if fees are distributed to student groups on a content-neutral
basis, then the programs have been deemed to serve the neutral purpose of
supporting a forum, not the purpose of espousing any particular group's
viewpoint. It is the lack of content-based standards that enables the system to
support a legitimate campus forum, and this in turn creates a distance between
those who fund the forum and any particular view expressed within it, thus
avoiding unconstitutional forced speech. The idea that support for a particular
group's speech as an incident to support for a campus forum does not imply
endorsement of that group's message was most clearly established in Widmar
v. Vincent.39 In Widmar, the Court rejected the university's argument that if
it were to allow religious groups to use its buildings, it would give the
impression that it was endorsing religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause: "[B]y creating a forum the University does not thereby endorse or
promote any of the particular ideas aired there."4
In deciding cases challenging public universities' use of mandatory fees
to support fora for student expression, several courts have held that the systems
were constitutional because they did not involve endorsement of any particular
group's speech.4' In rejecting a student's constitutional challenge to use of
mandatory fees to support a student newspaper, student association, and
campus speaker program, one court drew a distinction between forcing students
to adopt political opinions and imposing a tax with which to finance "programs
which provide a forum for expression of opinion., 42 The university funding
of programs that expressed "widely divergent opinions on a number of
38. Lace v. University of VL, 303 A.2d 475, 480 (Vt. 1973).
39. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
40. Id. at 272 n.10. In Widmar, mandatory student fees were used to defray the cost of facility use by
student groups such as the plaintiffs', so the issue of mandatory student fees being used to compel support
of speech was incorporated into the question of whether the university was endorsing speech by allowing
an organization to use its facilities. Id. at 265.
41. Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp.
149 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974); Good v. Associated
Students, 542 P.2d 762 OVash. 1975) (en banc); Lace, 303 A.2d at 475.
42. Veed, 353 . Supp. at 152-53.
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topics,"'43 did not show in itself that the university advocated a particular
philosophy or viewpoint.' Courts have also distinguished between forced
subsidization of particular causes and the forced subsidization of a "speakers
corner," such as that in Hyde Park, which "provides a platform for the
espousing of social, religious and political ideas by various and divergent
individuals ... to inject a spectrum of ideas into the campus community.""
In Good v. Associated Students,46 a Washington state case in which the court
upheld a student activity program similar to that at U.C. Berkeley, the court
held that students could be compelled to pay an activity fee to support
programs which foster "an atmosphere of learning, debate, dissent and
controversy."47 Although students may not agree with all the speech which
receives funding, "[i]f such views are expressed only as a part of the exchange
of ideas and there is no limitation or control imposed so that only one point
of view is expressed through the program, there is no violation of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs."4 The court reasoned that because the
university was funding a public forum, students were not forced to support
speech with which they disagreed. 9
The distinction between forced support of a public forum and forced
support of a particular speaker has also been used in upholding the
constitutionality of forced support of campus newspapers.5 Students may be
required to support a campus newspaper because it serves the permissible
government purpose of "complement[ing] classroom education by exposing the
student body to various points of view on significant issues, and [allowing]
students to express themselves on those issues.",5' Because particular editorial
positions do not claim to express the opinion of the entire student body, courts
have held that support for the newspaper does not imply that one agrees with
views expressed within the forum by particular speakers.5 As one court
stated,
43. Id. at 152.
44. Id.
45. Lace, 303 A.2d at 479.
46. 542 P.2d 762 (Wash. 1975) (en bane).
47. Id. at 768.
48. Id. at 769.
49. While funding student organizations with diverse viewpoints was constitutional, the court held that
the university "may not compel membership in an association ... which purports to represent all the
students at the university" when it makes political and ideological statements, id. at 768, for "[tlhere is no
room in the First Amendment for such absolute compulsory support, advocation and representation." Id.
This supports the thesis that what makes mandatory activity fee systems such as those at issue in Smith and
Good constitutional is the fact that they involve support for a public forum, or student organizations in their
totality, as opposed to support for any particular organization which espouses a particular point of view.
50. Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
51. Id. at 1362.
52. The newspaper "speaks only for those which control its content at any given time. It does not
speak on behalf of a group with which the plaintiffs are identified, i.e., the student body." Id.
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the University's imposition of student fees is not designed to further
the University's ideological biases, but instead to support an
independent student newspaper. The University's academic judgment
is that the paper is a vital part of the University's educational mission,
and that financing it is germane to the University's duties as an
educational institution.53
When a general fund is made available so that students of differing viewpoints
can express themselves to their fellow students, fee-paying students are not
being compelled to fund the dissemination of one viewpoint with which they
disagree.5
4
These cases indicate both (1) that activity group programs that support
student organizations holding a diversity of views, including political views,
can be considered educational and thus appropriate for universities to
administer, and (2) that in order to ensure that students are not forced to
endorse particular views when they pay their activity fees, funds cannot be
distributed within such programs in ways that favor some viewpoints over
others. Courts have been concerned with the possibility that the mandatory
student activity fee system could be used to distort public debate if funds are
given to student groups on the basis of their point of view.5 In addition, if
funds were given out in a content-biased way, the university would appear to
endorse the viewpoints of groups that had succeeded in their application for
funds. To avoid this possibility, students who wish to express their opposition
to positions taken by funded student groups must also have access to funds for
this purpose. Unless universities are forbidden from discriminating on the basis
of content in distributing funds, students who pay mandatory fees will in fact
be forced to subsidize a particular set of views rather than a public forum.
Thus, under the rationale which makes use of mandatory fees to support
political student speech constitutional-that the funds are used to support a
53. Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 480 (4th Cir. 1983). In Kania, a student at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill argued that Abood forbade the university from compelling the student to pay
the portion of his mandatory fees that funded a student newspaper, The Daily Tar Heel, with which he
disagreed.
54. In Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d I11 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1067
(1993), students also alleged that university funding of a student newspaper with mandatory fees violates
Abood. The court noted that the student-rn newspaper increased debate on campus and that the university
had not attempted to "control the viewpoints expressed by the newspaper and that there were no ideological
prerequisites for joining the paper's staff. The University provided the students with the funds needed for
the students themselves to engage in debate and did not force ideological conformity." Id. at 123. Again,
the fact that funds were not used to support one particular political or ideological position but to create a
forum for debate among political positions was viewed as an important distinction between the mandatory
activity fee system and the agency-shop system.
55. In Good, the court stated that a university may not give out funds to student groups in a manner
that promotes "one particular viewpoint, political, social, economic or religious." Good v. Associated
Students, 542 P.2d 762, 769 (Wash. 1975) (en banc). In Arrington, the court noted that while the school
newspaper's editorials may be subsidized, "plaintiffs have available an additional forum to express
themselves in opposition to views set forth therein." 380 F. Supp. at 1362.
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public forum for student speech-it is critical that the university distribute
funds to student groups on a content-neutral basis.
The fact that it is the concept of funding a public forum which made these
programs constitutional is highlighted by the only two cases in which courts
have found that Abood forbids compelled funding of political organizations.
Both of these cases involved groups seeking money for off-campus speech. In
both cases, the courts held that Abood prohibited universities from requiring
students to support off-campus activities by Public Interest Research Groups
(PIRG's).56 In Galda v. Rutgers,5 7 the court explained that a distinction
could be drawn between a PIRG and student organizations funded through
student activity fees. "[T]he student activity fee is used to subsidize a variety
of student groups, and therefore that assessment can be 'perceived broadly as
providing a 'forum' for a diverse range of opinion,' ''58 and "exposing the
university community to a diversity of responsible opinion."59 The PIRG, by
contrast, is a separate entity which takes single, consolidated political positions
and conducts much of its speech outside the campus forum. In Carroll v.
Blinken,60 the court held that a PIRG served university-related functions
sufficient to justify its compelled funding for its speech on campus.6' Indeed,
the court noted that a scheme in which funding was optional would impair the
group's ability to enrich campus life, and "funding would be balkanized and
students would cease to be linked by a common bond to the tolerant support
of all points of view."6 As to off-campus activities, however, the court found
that the educational value of activities did not justify compelled student
support. Both Galda and Carroll suggest that until Smith, courts allowed
universities to charge mandatory fees to support political speech within the
campus forum, as long as the system created a true public forum in which the
56. In Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065 (1986), the court
held that a state university could not compel students to pay a fee, "to an independent outside organization
that espouses and actively promotes a political and ideological philosophy which they oppose and do not
wish to support." Id. at 1064. The court went to great lengths to make clear that it did not decide whether




59. Id. at 1067.
60. 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992).
61. Id. at 1000-01.
62. Id. at 1002.
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government did not discriminate against speakers on the basis of the content
of their speech.63
I[I. PUBLIC FORUM DoCTRINE
It is well established that when a public university opens campus spaces
for expression by student groups, it creates a public forum.64 A public
university cannot prevent groups from using public facilities that constitute a
public forum on the basis of the content of the groups' speech,6 nor can it
prevent the campus from becoming a public forum for students simply by
imposing rules that partially limit speech on campus grounds.66 Relying on
the conventional conception of "public fora' as spatial property, one might
argue that while public university campus grounds and facilities are a public
forum for students, access to funds used to amplify one's speech within the
63. This analysis is also consistent with Student Gov't Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 868 F.2d 473, 476
(lst Cir. 1989), in which the court refused to engage in a public forum analysis of the University of
Massachusetts' decision to abolish its Legal Services Office, because the office was not a public forum.
Rather, the court held, the office existed to help students participate in the public forum of the court system.
This distinction, between a group which speaks within the campus forum and a group which helps students
speak within an outside forum, is similar to the Galda and Carroll distinction between PIRG groups
organized for on-campus speech and those which lobby in another public forum, the state legislature. Only
if speech is directed to the on-campus forum is public forum doctrine controlling.
64. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (public university
campus is a "designated" public forum); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) ("[Ihe campus
of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum.");
Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 116 (5th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1067 (1993)
("[T]he outdoor grounds of the campus such as the sidewalks and plazas are designated public fora for the
speech of university students."). Because public university campuses are sometimes described as
"designated" public fora and sometimes simply as public fora, and because the same standards govern
designated public fora and public fora, see infra note 65, this Note refers to them simply as "public fora."
65. The type of speech restrictions the government is permitted to make depends on the character of
the public property on which the speech takes place. In Perry, the Court recognized three categories of
public property for the purposes of public forum analysis: the traditional public forum, the limited or
designated public forum, and the nonpublic forum. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. Quintessential traditional
public fora are public streets and parks, which for "time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 515 (1939). In traditional public fora the government may not discriminate among speakers on
the basis of the content of their speech without narrowly drawn restrictions that serve a compelling state
interest. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. In limited or designated public fora, property not traditionally open for free
speech but which the government has "expressly dedicated to speech activity," United States v. Kokinda,
497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990), the state "is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.
Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be
narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest." Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Examples of limited or
designated public fora include university meeting facilities, school board meetings, and municipal theater.
Id. at 45-46. Thus, in Widmar, the Court held that a public university may not prevent religious groups
from using campus facilities on the basis of the content of the group's speech. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-77.
Finally, in nonpublic fora, "[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication," such as the school mail facilities at issue in Perry, the government may restrict speech
according to content to reserve the forum for its intended purposes. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Regulations of
speech in nonpublic fora need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. id.
66. Hays, 969 F.2d at 117. To determine whether the campus serves as a public forum for students,
the court must look to whether the university has a general policy and practice of allowing student speech
on campus.
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forum need not be analyzed in terms of public forum doctrine. Presumably the
California Supreme Court did just that, thereby removing the mandatory
funding system from public forum analysis. This Part argues that a stark
distinction between granting access to public fora as space and granting money
for the speech within that space is superficial. For the forum to be
meaningfully available to speakers on a content-neutral basis, both access to
space for expressive activity and access to funds with which to support
expression within that space must be distributed on a content-neutral basis.
A. Public Forum Doctrine Governs Resources that Support Speech Within the
Campus Forum
"The object of public forum doctrine," states Robert Post, "is the
constitutional clarification and regulation of government authority over
particular resources.' 67 Space is a resource that, like any other resource
student organizations need to engage in speech, can be reduced to financial
terms.65 Simply by maintaining a forum without charging any user fee, the
government in effect subsidizes the speech that takes place within that
forum. 69 A group that can use university facilities for speech in meetings and
presentations to the larger campus community saves the significant cost of
renting space. 70 Thus, even where the public forum at issue can easily be
conceptualized as a space, what is in fact at issue is the government's ability
to make content-based distinctions in subsidizing the use of that space. The
creation and maintenance of a public forum can be seen as a subsidy of speech
67. Robert C. Post, Betveen Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1782 (1987).
68. As Elena Kagan points out, "There are many ways for the government to pay for speech, and all
content-based underinclusion cases-regardless whether they involve the writing of a check from tax
revenues-involve some mechanism by which the government picks up some of the costs of a speaker's
expression." Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust
v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 Sup. CT. R v. 29, 50-51.
69. The argument that public forum doctrine governs public spending for private speech dovetails with
Alexander Meiklejohn's conception of the public forum. Meiklejohn commented on
how inadequate, to the degree of non-existence, are our public provisions for active discussions
among the members of our self-governing society. As we try to create and enlarge freedom,
such universal discussion is imperative. In every village, in every district of every town or city,
there should be established at public expense cultural centers inviting all citizens, as they may
choose, to meet together for the consideration of public policy.
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 260 (emphasis
added). Meiklejohn's vision of the public forum recognizes that for a public forum to offer a valuable range
and quality of speech, the government must act positively to create and support public fora. By inextricably
linking funding and speaking, this model obscures the line between passively tolerating free speech in
public places and actively encouraging it by creating fora for speech at public expense.
70. A district court noted that the university's refusal in Widmar "to 'subsidize' the religious group
by allowing it the free use of facilities granted other student groups" amounted to an infringement on group
members' right to associate. Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-33 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (emphasis
added).
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that occurs on public property, such as public university campuses, that is
traditionally or by designation dedicated to public debate.7 '
Even a paradigmatic public forum case such as Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association72 reveals the fallacy of
distinguishing between granting an organization access to a spatial forum and
subsidizing its speech within that forum. Perry is conventionally thought of as
a case about access to a spatial forum, school district mailboxes. However, the
plaintiffs in Perry did not simply want access to the mailboxes as space in
which to transmit speech-they wanted to take advantage of the interschool
mail delivery system.73 Access to the public forum of the mail system was
desirable because it constituted subsidized transmission of messages to
teachers.74 Comparably, student organizations that seek access to mandatory
funds are not barred from speaking within the forum. They have a formal right
to use the forum for communication, but, after Smith, if the content of their
speech is political, their right to use the forum is detached from a valuable
subsidy to support use of the forum-a subsidy that other forum-users are
granted. Just as use of the mail system in Perry could not be separated from
subsidized transmission of mail, student organizations' ability to use the
campus forum cannot be separated from the ability to apply for funds to
support speech within the forum on the same basis as other student
organizations do.
71. David Cole's recent analysis of public subsidies for speech supports the view that the principle
of government neutrality governs both access to certain spaces and resources for speech within those
spaces. David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-
Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 709-10 (1992). Professor Cole argues that a "republican"
conception of the First Amendment is not content with government noninterference with private speech,
but encourages the maintenance of public institutions which encourage "ordinary people" to engage in
"ongoing dialogue about public values and norms." Id. at 709-10. Maintenance of public fora is a means
whereby the government subsidizes speech. Professor Cole argues that the reason public forum doctrine
forbids all content-based discrimination-and not just the viewpoint-based discrimination that standard
subsidy doctrine forbids-is that (1) the public property at issue plays a critical role in public debate, and
(2) the public spaces at issue are "dedicated to, or at least consistent with, expression, [so] their functioning
will not be hindered by a neutrality mandate." Id. at 718. In granting funds for speech within these
"institutional spheres of independence and neutrality," id. at 681, the government must remain neutral
toward the content of applicants' speech. Thus, public forum doctrine is not distinguishable from subsidy
doctrine simply because one involves passive tolerance of speech while the other involves active funding
of speech.
72. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
73. Id. at 41. As the Court noted, the plaintiffs already had access to several different media with
which to communicate to the teachers, ranging from school bulletin boards to the U.S. mail system. Id. If
the plaintiffs' goal had only been to communicate with teachers, they could have simply used the U.S. mail
to send them messages at school.
74. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985), the Court stated that
in Perry, it had "defined the forum as a school's internal mail system and the teachers' mailboxes,
notwithstanding that an 'internal mail system' lacks a physical situs." Id. at 801. In Perry, the Court held
that the mailboxes were a nonpublic forum and thus the school district could preserve them for their
intended purpose by allowing only the official union to use the mail system. 460 U.S. at 51-53. The Court
decided this on the basis of a finding that the mail system had not been made available to the general
public in the past, not because the mail system was too dissimilar to traditional spatial property to be
considered a forum.
The Yale Law Journal
Recognition that use of the campus forum cannot be separated from
subsidies which support that use can be seen in Healy v. James,75 a case in
which the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment places restrictions on
how a public university treats student organizations. The Court held that a
public university's failure to recognize a student chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society (hereinafter "SDS"), thus limiting its access to university
facilities and services,76 violated students' First Amendment right to associate
to further their personal beliefs and participate in the "intellectual give and take
of campus debate.",77 The Court discussed the difficulty of distinguishing a
forum analysis from a subsidy analysis in the campus setting: Refusal to
subsidize a group's speech can seriously hamper the group's ability to
participate in the public forum. "We are not free," the Court stated, "to
disregard the practical realities' 78 that a denial of university funding would
pose for the group. The Court recognized that allowing the group to exist
while denying it free use of university facilities for meetings and university
media for communication "does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities
imposed" by nonrecognition. 9 The First Amendment mandated that SDS'
political speech not only be tolerated within a certain public space, but also
that its use of that space for expression be supported by the university
according to the same guidelines which provided other organizations support
for expressive activities.
B. Public Forum Doctrine as Creating a Baseline Expectation of Funding on
a Content-Neutral Basis
Another way of looking at the relationship between access to public space
and funds for speech has to do with speakers' expectation of how they will be
treated when using government resources for speech. For instance, Seth
Kreimer understands public forum doctrine to be based on a theory that when
the government has historically made its property available for private speech,
it must continue to do so because citizens have a "baseline" expectation that
they will be able to speak freely in that space.80 In addition, Professor
Kreimer sees the "principle of equality of distribution as the baseline from
which allocational decisions can be judged"8' as critical to public forum
75. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
76. While the administration of Central Connecticut State College did not forbid the group from
forming and speaking on campus, denial of official recognition meant that students could not use the
student newspaper and campus bulletin boards to advertise the group's meetings and other activities, and
that the group could not use campus facilities to hold meetings. Id. at 176.
77. Id. at 181.
78. Id. at 183.
79. Id.
80. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1359 (1984).
81. Id. at 1365.
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cases. A scheme that singles out one class of speakers, denying that class
benefits available to others, offends the First Amendment. If the norm is to
fund speech, as it is in the context of a public university in which student
organizations that comply with content-neutral regulations are generally able
to receive funds with which to engage in speech, then refusing to subsidize a
subset of student organizations based on the content of their speech violates
the public forum doctrine when understood in terms of baseline expectations.
Such a denial singles out groups that engage in speech with a particular
content and deprives them of an ability to apply for funds which have
historically been available to student groups and which are available to all
other student organizations on the basis of content-neutral regulations.8 2
C. Cases Treating Use of Campus Resources as a Public Forum
These related theories of public forum doctrine-that it governs both
access to space and access to funds for speech within that space, and that it
governs grants for speech when speakers have a baseline expectation that
grants will be distributed on a content-neutral basis-can be seen in cases
involving university control over the content of speech in programs for student
expression which go beyond tolerance of speech on campus grounds. Courts
have recognized that when a public university commits to support a forum for
student expression, it may not justify discriminating against speakers within
that forum based on the content of their speech by arguing that prior to the
university's commitment to fund the forum, the speaker had no constitutional
right to have his or her speech subsidized by the state.
Cases involving university-funded school newspapers, for example, rest on
this positive conception of public forum doctrine. In Antonelli v. Hammond,3
a university administration required that materials in the student newspaper be
approved prior to publication, and refused to release funds necessary for the
newspaper to print an article by Eldridge Cleaver. Characterizing the university
setting as an open forum where the interchange of ideas should be encouraged,
the court held that the university's action violated the First Amendment. The
court explained that the "state is not necessarily the unrestrained master of
what it creates and fosters."84 Once a state creates a forum that is generally
open for student speech, it may not selectively discriminate against speech on
the basis of content or viewpoint.85 Similarly, in Trujillo v. Love, 6 the court
82. Thus Professor Kreimer analyzes Widmar v. Vincent as a case in which the university violated the
Constitution not because it denied a student organization any constitutional right to the provision of meeting
facilities, but because the university's rule "single[d] out for exclusion from otherwise available benefits
those who exercise a particular right." Id. at 1367.
83. 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970).
84. Id. at 1337.
85. For example, in Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973), the court held that if a
public university establishes a student newspaper, it cannot suppress its publication because college officials
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observed that the student newspaper at issue had historically been perceived
as a public forum for student speech, and held that when the university
suspended a student editor because of the content of articles she wanted to
publish, it engaged in unconstitutional content-based censorship.87
The facts of Stanley v. Magrath,88 another student newspaper case, in
some ways parallel those of Smith. In Stanley, a public university newspaper
had published an issue that many readers found offensive. In response, the
regents changed the system for funding the student newspaper from a
mandatory student activity fee to a refundable fee. The court held that the new
policy was unconstitutional in that it deprived students of funds to print the
newspaper because of the content of the message conveyed by the newspaper.
The court's holding relied on an understanding of public forum doctrine which
extends to the government's positive acts to create what the student body
regards as a public forum. Had the Smith court used this conception of public
forum doctrine in deciding the constitutional challenge to funding political
student groups, it would have seen that cutting off mandatory funds solely to
groups which engage in "political" speech violates the First Amendment.
D. Content-Based Subsidies Distort the Forum
The basis for asserting that public forum doctrine should not recognize a
distinction between access to government property for speech and access to
funds for speech within that property is not only that access to spatial property
is properly understood as a type of subsidy, but also that content-based
discrimination in granting subsidies for speech within a public forum harms the
forum. This is because funding influences the type of speech that will occur
within that forum. As Owen Fiss has noted, "government subsidies are not
gifts or bonuses for acts that would have occurred without them. Subsidies...
have a productive value: they bring into existence ... [expression] that would
not have existed but for the subsidies."89 Restrictions on the expression of
certain viewpoints, whether in the form of withholding subsidies or of banning
speech by effectively excising a "particular point of view from public debate
.... mutilate 'the thinking process of the community' and [are] thus
incompatible with the central precepts of the first amendment." 90 Just as
banning speech according to its content within a public forum defeats the goal
of allowing individuals to speak-and listeners to be exposed to speech-on
disapprove of its editorials.
86. 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971).
87. Id. at 1270.
88. 719 E2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983).
89. Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087, 2096 (1991).
90. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cll. L REV. 46, 55 (1987) (quoting
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLMICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960)).
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representative viewpoints regarding topics of the day, selectively withholding
funds from groups based on the viewpoint or content of their speech skews
debate within the forum.
Donald Beschle discusses this relationship between selective funding and
skewed debate within the public forum by comparing funding of speech within
a public forum to the funding of art within a public forum. Beschle asks what
the consequence would be if, when the government subsidizes art within a
traditional public forum such as a public park, "the government were to fund
certain private displays, and withhold funding for others, based upon the
viewpoints represented?... [T]he effect of the program will be to maximize
the exposure of endorsed views and minimize the exposure of alternatives." 9'
Selective government funding distorts public debate by magnifying the
significance of private individuals' expression which, on the basis of its
content, qualifies for government subsidies. This is deceptive because the
public assumes that speech or art within a public forum is representative of
views held by members of the public as opposed to officially sanctioned views.
For instance, those who reasonably assume that the U.C. Berkeley campus is
a public forum for student groups may not realize that some groups' speech
is subsidized by the University due to its content while others' speech is not,
distorting public debate in the way Beschle describes. In order for the
government to support a representative, authentic public forum for the
dissemination of private views, "the system may not be structured to exclude
officially disapproved positions. This should be so whether the resource is a
venue or a dollar.' 9
2
Courts that have used public forum doctrine to decide cases regarding
university discretion in funding student organizations have implicitly adopted
the view that once the government funds some speech, denial of funds for
speech based on its content distorts public debate in a far more invidious way
than flat refusals by the government to fund any speech. The preceding cases
91. Donald L. Beschle, Conditional Spending and The First Amendment: Maintaining the Commitment
to Rational Liberal Dialogue, 57 MO. L. REV. 1117, 1150 (1992). One commentator suggests that selective,
content-based funding may be more effective in skewing debate than content-based criminal prohibitions
on speech. Cole, supra note 71, at 705. A federal district court recently recognized some of these concerns
in deciding a case involving public funding of the arts. In Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795
F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992), the court rejected the NEA's argument that denial of a grant application
to produce performance art was not an injury because it was a mere refusal to subsidize expressive
activities rather than a barrier to their exercise. Plaintiffs' allegation that they were denied grants, or
penalized, on the basis of the content of past speech, stated a claim that they had suffered an injury under
the First Amendment. Id. at 1463-64. One argument plaintiffs made was that "public subsidization of art,
like public funding of the press and university activities, demands government neutrality." Id. at 1472. The
court agreed with the plaintiffs, affirming that both academic and artistic expression are "at the core of a
democratic society's cultural and political vitality." Id. at 1473. The court focused on the concept of
academic freedom as a protection of professors' speech, but the analogy can also extend to the campus as
a public forum. If "government funding of the arts is subject to the constraints of the First Amendment,"
id. at 1475, such that it does not have free rein to impose content restrictions on grantees, the same should
apply for government funding of speech within the campus forum.
92. Beschle, supra note 91, at 1149.
19941 2027
The Yale Law Journal
regarding funding student newspapers are evidence that courts have recognized
this when judging the government's freedom to withdraw funding from speech
in programs it has already begun to support. In Swope v. Lubbers,93 a court
stated this proposition strongly in holding that the university administration
violated students' First Amendment rights by refusing to pay for the rental of
X-rated films to show on campus. The court stated that "by the withholding
of funds defendants have effectively ensured that a movie of which they
disapprove will not be seen .... The label may be 'funding' but the
demonstrated effect is censorship."'94 The administration's action violated
students' First Amendment rights by discriminating against speech on the basis
of its content regardless of the fact that a subsidy was involved. Thus, past
courts have recognized that when universities offer funds to support expressive
activities on a content-neutral basis, subsequent denials of funding due to the
content of expression are indistinguishable from content-based prohibitions of
speech.
E. Subsidy Doctrine and Funding Speech Within a Designated Public Forum
Notwithstanding the prior discussion, some will argue that funds that a
public university grants to student groups should be analyzed separately as
public subsidies of speech. Even under pure subsidy doctrine, however, cutting
off subsidies from "political" speech is problematic from a First Amendment
standpoint. While subsidy doctrine allows the government to incorporate values
into publicly supported programs that have a speech element, subsidy cases
also recognize that for public fora to be legitimate, should the state use
subsidies to finance speech within the public forum, funds must be distributed
on a content-neutral basis. Thus, when a subsidy is used to create a public
forum, the principles of subsidy doctrine are identical to those of public forum
doctrine. Courts have held that while the government may not support one
viewpoint over another in distributing funds,95 the government may define
and fund a program on the basis of adopting one value over another. In Rust
v. Sullivan,96 the Court held that
the Government may make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion, and implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds.... [I]n implementing the statutory prohibition by forbidding
counseling, referral, and the provision of information regarding
abortion as a method of family planning, the regulations simply
93. 560 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
94. Id. at 1332.
95. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (the government may not
"discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas')
(quoting Cammarano v. United States, 385 U.S. 498 (1959)).
96. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
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ensure that appropriated funds are not used for activities, including
speech, that are outside the federal program's scope.97
Title X projects were not defined to include abortion counseling, so the
government could prohibit such speech. "The condition that federal funds will
be used only to further the purposes of a grant does not violate constitutional
rights. 98
Although Rust holds that the government may define and fund a project
that incorporates certain values, Rust does not preclude an argument that, in
some circumstances, the government must distribute funds according to the
principles of public forum doctrine. In Rust, the Court distinguished situations
in which the scope of the program the government funds does not extend to
certain topics of speech from cases in which the government creates a public
forum.99 The Court recognized that "the existence of a Government 'subsidy,'
in the form of Government-owned property, does not justify the restriction of
speech in areas that have 'been traditionally open to the public for expressive
activity,' or have been 'expressly dedicated to speech activity.""O' If the
purpose of a government subsidy is to maintain a space in which the public
can be exposed to free speech, then, regardless of speakers' rights to subsidies,
grants must be made on a content-neutral basis for the funded space to operate
as a legitimate public forum from the audience's perspective.'0 t For the
audience, the First Amendment danger lies in the "indoctrinating effect of a
monopolized marketplace of ideas" masquerading as a public forum.'0 2 As
one commentator points out, the government can distort public debate when
its influence on private speech is not obvious:
As an initial matter, when the government itself speaks in favor of a
position, we (the people) know who is talking and can evaluate the
speech accordingly.... By contrast, when the government finances
hitherto private parties to do its speaking, we may have little
understanding of the source of the expression .... [T]he speakers may
have foregone their expression (or even espoused a different view) in
the absence of a subsidy. We do not know whether to treat the
speakers as independent or as hired guns.... When the government
speaks through subsidy schemes, it may change and reshape the
underlying dialogue. 10 3
97. Id. at 1763 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 1775.
99. For a discussion of this distinction, see Cole, supra note 71, at 685-94.
100. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1776 (citations omitted).
101. As Professor Cole points out, when the government funds speech, "first amendment concerns are
not limited to potential coercion of the subsidized speaker, but extend also, and perhaps more importantly,
to the listener." Cole, supra note 71, at 680.
102. Id.
103. Kagan, supra note 68, at 55; see Cole, supra note 71, at 675 (arguing that when the government
funds speech in certain "spheres of neutrality," including public forums and public universities, it should
20291994]
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Thus, when subsidies can be characterized as public fora, or when subsidies
are used in a program that the public understands to support private speech on
a content-neutral basis, the standards of public forum doctrine apply.
The U.C. Berkeley campus, like other public university campuses, is a
public forum in which all student organizations may speak, but under Smith,
only nonpolitical organizations qualify to receive funding from mandatory
student fees. To the outside observer, it appears that student organizations
speak within the campus forum according to how strongly their members feel
or how many members they have, but in reality "apolitical" groups will be
subsidized while "political" groups will not. The observer will be unaware of
the disparity in subsidization between groups and thus will misinterpret the
debate within the forum. For the University to create and support a legitimate
public forum for student speech, it must be permitted to make content-neutral
grants to student organizations that wish to speak within the forum.
Once the university creates and funds a forum for campus speech, it has
an obligation not to discriminate against student groups based on the viewpoint
or content of their speech. Resources of space as well as money enable student
groups to speak on campus through such forms as speaker programs, films,
newsletters, leaflets, signs, and advertisements announcing meetings and
events. By classifying a group as "political" under the Smith plan, one
relegates it to seeking voluntary contributions from students each semester. For
the campus grounds to function as a true public forum, the relationship
between money and speech cannot be ignored while the relationship between
space and speech is venerated by the public forum doctrine.
IV. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL SPEECH AS
VIEWPOINT-BASED DISCRIMINATION
Even if the public university campus is properly considered a public
forum, for the sake of argument it is worth considering a contention that public
forum doctrine does not apply to the question of whether the University can
deny funding to all "political" and "ideological" student groups.'04 For
example, one might believe that the fact that funded speech will take place
within a public forum is irrelevant, and the appropriate doctrine for deciding
do so on a content-neutral basis); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 233-34 (1993) (pointing out that when the government speaks, people will listen with a certain
degree of skepticism, while when a private speaker speaks using government funds, people will not know
if the person's expression is influenced by the government subsidy program's content-biases); cf. Post,
supra note 67, at 1833-34 (arguing that when the government exercises "managerial" authority, nonpublic
forum guidelines should apply, but when the government exercises its "governance" authority over the
public realm, traditional public forum guidelines should apply).
104. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Gordon, Comment, University Regulation of Student Speech: Considering
Content-Based Criteria Under Public Forum and Subsidy Doctrines, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 412; see
also Christina E. Wells, Comment, Mandatory Student Fees: First Amendment Concerns and University
Discretion, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 363, 388 (1988).
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whether the University may refuse to fund only "political" student groups
would be standard subsidy doctrine. The governing subsidy doctrine case on
this question is Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 105 in which the Court
held that Congress would not violate the Constitution if it chose "not to
subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities."'
0 6
The government is only required to be neutral as to the viewpoint, or "idea,"
expressed by the speaker in granting a subsidy.0 7 According to several
commentators' interpretation of pure subsidy doctrine, "a university decision
not to fund any political speech is a decision based upon neutral principles
because it does not discriminate among political viewpoints."' 0 8 In order to
determine whether or not a subject matter restriction should be analyzed as
though it constituted viewpoint-based discrimination, Professor Stone suggests
examining the restriction and determining whether in practice it will have a
more severe impact on one viewpoint than another. 109 "[Nlarrowly defined
subject-matter restrictions having a clear viewpoint-differential impact seem to
implicate directly both of the concerns underlying the Court's special treatment
of content-based restrictions," which are to create a marketplace of ideas and
to demonstrate government impartiality."'
This Part argues that, in application, a refusal to fund "political" and
"ideological" speech is likely to result in harmful viewpoint-based
discrimination. If one looks at recent Supreme Court cases dealing with speech,
an argument can be made that, at least in certain contexts, the adjective
"political" describes a viewpoint rather than subject matter. In addition, if one
looks at student speech in practice, one can see that withholding funds from
"political" and "ideological" student groups amounts to viewpoint-based
discrimination.
A. Regulation Based on Content, Subject Matter, and Viewpoint
As an initial matter, it is useful to consider how the Court has defined
"viewpoint discrimination." Courts have identified three types of speech
regulations as potentially problematic-those that limit speech on the basis of
content, subject matter, and viewpoint. Courts have had difficulty, however, in
105. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
106. Id. at 544.
107. Id. at 548.
108. Wells, supra note 104, at 388. Geoffrey Stone suggests that a ban on "political" speech operates
as "subject-matter" discrimination rather than viewpoint-based discrimination. Geoffrey R. Stone,
Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content; The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 81, 112 (1978). Cass Sunstein points out that in some circumstances, the Supreme Court has
permitted a ban on political speech on public property. SUNSTEIN, supra note 103, at 172 (referring to Greer
v. Spock, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), permitting ban on partisan political speech at army bases, and Lehman v.
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), permitting ban on political advertisements in buses).
109. Stone, supra note 108, at 109-10.
110. d. at 111.
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clearly and consistently defining the difference between them. The "content-
based" term attempts to distinguish regulations that govern speech according
to the message conveyed (content-based) from those which regulate speech
without regard to the message conveyed (content-neutral)."' For example,
while a law that restricts noisy speech near a hospital is content-neutral
because it limits speech without regard to the message conveyed,"2 a law
that restricts speech about labor disputes near a hospital is content-based since
it regulates speech according to the message conveyed. Whereas content-
neutral laws may limit the time, place, and manner of speech in any forum, all
content-based restrictions are forbidden in traditional and designated public
fora absent a compelling state interest."
3
Within the category of "content-based" regulations, courts have
distinguished between those that regulate an entire "general subject" and those
that regulate according to the viewpoint conveyed. For example, a law
prohibiting all picketing near a hospital except that involving labor disputes
would be a subject matter restriction," 4 whereas a law allowing picketing in
favor of a strike but prohibiting picketing against a strike would be viewpoint-
based." 5 As noted above, the government may discriminate on the basis of
subject matter, but not viewpoint, in distributing subsidies for speech."16
B. "Political" and "Ideological" as Viewpoints
The Court seems to have already recognized that regulations that
discriminate against certain controversial subjects are in fact viewpoint-based.
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,' '7 the
Court held that in granting use of its facilities, a school district violated the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when it discriminated against
organizations that wished to use the facilities for religious purposes.' 5 The
Court held that even if the school facilities were a nonpublic forum,"9
discriminating against religious groups is viewpoint-based because it allows
111. Stone, supra note 90, at 47-50.
112. Id. at 48.
113. See supra note 65.
114. Such a law would restrict expressive conduct according to a "classification[] formulated in terms
of the subject" of expression. Police Dep't v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Stone, supra note
90, at 86.
115. This sort of law would be viewpoint based since it regulates speech according to whether one
supports or opposes a certain action. See also Justice Brennan's distinction between regulations pertaining
to the subject of discussion and those pertaining to views on that subject. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 59, 61 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Stone, supra note 90).
116. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
117. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
118. Id. at 2147.
119. Recall that in nonpublic forums, content-based discrimination is allowed but viewpoint-based
discrimination is prohibited. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
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use of school property for presentation of all views about certain subjects
"except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint."'20
The court's treatment of "religious" as a point of view suggests that
categories of speech that might have once been considered subject matter- or
content-based may now be considered viewpoint-based. If speech that deals
with families from a religious perspective can be characterized as speech on
the subject of families from a religious point of view, it is difficult to see why
speech on, for instance, the subject of the environment from a political
perspective is not speech on an apolitical subject from a political point of view.
When a certain viewpoint is so closely tied to a particular subject that to
prohibit discussion of the subject silences speakers with that point of view (as
a ban on speech about religion would do for speakers with a religious point of
view), the Court has indicated that it is appropriate to recognize that what
appears to be subject matter discrimination functions as viewpoint
discrimination. Just as the Court regarded speech that incorporates a religious
view of the world as speech of a particular viewpoint, speech that is informed
by a political view of the world should be categorized as viewpoint-based,
following the reasoning of Lamb's Chapel.
C. Discrimination Against "Political" and "Ideological" Speech as
Viewpoint-Based in Practice
In practice, a refusal to allow "political" and "ideological" student groups
to apply for mandatory funds amounts to viewpoint discrimination. Consider,
for example, Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, a case challenging a rule
prohibiting the funding of any student group "organized around sexual
preference."' 2' It is easy to see how such a subject matter restriction can fit
into a campaign to silence gay and lesbian student groups on the basis of their
"view" about homosexuality.'22 In response to a refusal to fund a student
organization in the context of such a campaign, the Eighth Circuit held that
discrimination in funding on the basis of distaste for a group's ideas violates
the Constitution because
a public body that chooses to fund speech or expression must do so
even-handedly, without discriminating among recipients on the basis
120. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147.
121. Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1988). The Student Senate
at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, passed this regulation, but because the rule was vetoed by the
student association president before it could take effect, the court did not rule on its constitutionality. The
court's holding pertains to the university's refusal to fund the Gay & Lesbian Student Association in light
of a history of attempts to deny support to the group because of the content of its speech.
122. The plaintiffs' attorney in Smith claimed that a ban on funding "political" speech with mandatory
activity fees will prohibit funding the Gay and Lesbian Student Union at Berkeley, illustrating how the
facially neutral ban on "political" speech may behave in a similarly viewpoint-biased way. Hager, supra
note 12, at A3.
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of their ideology. The University need not supply funds to student
organizations; but once having decided to do so, it is bound by the
First Amendment to act without regard to the content of the ideas
being expressed. 23
When the subject matter of which a group speaks is inherently controversial,
it is difficult to categorize the discrimination against it as either content-based
or viewpoint-based. While "sexual preference" is a subject, the restriction will
disparately impact students who hold the more controversial view on the
subject. Students who practice or believe in heterosexuality do not have the
same need to organize for support and education as students who practice or
believe in homosexuality; mainstream culture is geared towards
heterosexuality, obviating the need for a person who supports heterosexuality
to take a political stand on the issue. Notwithstanding claims by the student
association that they refused to fund the group for viewpoint-neutral reasons,
the Eighth Circuit had no difficulty characterizing the entire campaign of
which the proposed ban was a part as impermissible discrimination on the
basis of ideology.
124
Without explicitly acknowledging it, the Supreme Court seemed to adopt
this approach to determining whether a regulation is viewpoint-based or subject
matter-based in R.A.V v. City of St. Paul.'25 In Justice Scalia's majority
opinion, the Court held that a city ordinance criminalizing symbolic speech
that "one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender'
'2 6
is unconstitutional because it "prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on
the basis of the subjects the speech addresses."' 27 One could argue, as Justice
Stevens did in his concurrence, that the ordinance was viewpoint-neutral, or
only discriminated on the basis of subject matter, because it concerned all
"fighting words" based on a person's race, color, creed, religion, or
gender. 28 However, in delivering the majority opinion, Justice Scalia did not
distinguish subject matter- and viewpoint-based discrimination. He argued that
the ordinance was unconstitutional because in operation it would discriminate
on the basis of viewpoint-it would leave unregulated nonracist fighting words
uttered by opponents of racism, but prohibit racist statements by proponents
of racism.
An analogy to R.A.V can be made when analyzing discrimination against
political speech. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence, a ban on
hurtful racist speech is in one sense viewpoint-neutral-it protects members of
123. Gohn, 850 F.2d at 362.
124. Id. at 366-68.
125. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
126. St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minneapolis Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990).
127. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2542 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 2570-71 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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all races who are insulted on the basis of their race.129 Similarly, some might
argue, a rule that no "political" student groups may apply for funds generated
by mandatory student fees could be characterized as viewpoint-neutral because
it applies to all "political" groups regardless of the particular viewpoint that
they espouse. However, in R.A.V the majority characterized the ban as
viewpoint-based, because the ordinance criminalized the speech of those who
want to use fighting words to express a view of the world informed by
racism-or racist fighting words-while it did not restrict the speech of people
who want to use fighting words to express a view of the world informed by
some other system of ordering reality. Could not the same be said for
discriminating against student groups that want to speak about the world in
terms of politics instead of, for instance, athletic rivalries? 3'
For instance, one group Smith identifies as "political" is the U.C. Berkeley
Feminist Alliance and Women Organized Against Sexual Harassment
(FAWOASH). FAWOASH might not limit its political opponents to anti-
feminist "political" groups. FAWOASH might also oppose aspects of campus
culture, such as the football team, which, while not "political" in a narrow
sense of the term, have been linked to campus sexual harassment and rape of
women.' 3 ' The impact of the Smith order on FAWOASH would be
viewpoint-neutral in a narrow sense-just as FAWOASH's speech would
decrease under the activity fee system ordered by Smith, so would the speech
of its opponents, a hypothetical group which takes an anti-feminist position on
political issues. 32 The claim that the Smith order is therefore viewpoint-
neutral parallels Justice Stevens' claim that the ordinance in R.A.V was
viewpoint-neutral: both the speech of those who wish to offend people on the
basis of being black and those who wish to offend people on the basis of being
white or any other race are banned, so the ordinance is neutral.
Justice Scalia, however, was concerned with a different type of opponent
in the debate. This opponent does not wish to use speech to express an
opposing view within racist discourse, but instead wants to argue that people
129. Id. at 2571.
130. If R.A.V only applies to laws that discriminate against speech within the realm of fighting words,
the analogy does not work. To the majority, however, the crucial point was that the speech was used in
debate by speakers who held a certain viewpoint, not that the words were fighting words. In the majority
opinion, Justice Scalia stated that "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that all of the expression reached by the ordinance
is proscribable under the 'fighting words' doctrine, we nonetheless conclude that the ordinance is facially
unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addresses." Id. at 2542.
131. According to Bernice Sandier, director of the Project on the Status of vomen for the Association
of American Colleges, 80-90% of men involved in college gang rapes are members of fraternities or student
athletic groups, usually football or basketball teams. William Douglas, Disturbing Pattern Seen in Gang
Rapes; Many Linked to Male Rites of 'Bonding', NEWSDAY, May 13, 1990, at 2. Indeed, a charge of gang
rape made against four football players in 1986 precipitated the formation of a campus anti-rape coalition
at U.C. Berkeley, a group which can be compared to FAWOASH. Coeds Stage Anti-Rape Rally on
Berkeley Campus, UPI, Dec. 6, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
132. Comparably, under the Smith system, pro-choice and anti-choice student organizations would be
hurt to the same degree.
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should not be valued on the basis of their race. In other words, Justice Scalia
was not concerned with debate between white supremacists and black
supremacists, but with argument between racists and groups who do not think
the world should be ordered in terms of race. Justice Scalia's concern was that
opponents of racism would be free to use the fighting words of their
choice-non-racist fighting words-to offend racists, while the racists could
not use the fighting words of their choice-racist fighting words-to fight
back.133
The analogue to the nonracist group in the FAWOASH example would be
a group of students who do not believe that institutions such as the school
football team are "political." Like the Smith court, these students are likely to
conclude quickly that a group such as FAWOASH, which concerns itself with
rape and sexual harassment, is clearly "political," whereas the school football
team has nothing to do with rape and sexual harassment, and is therefore
apolitical. However, it is not irrational to believe that such institutions as the
school football team are intimately connected with campus rape and sexual
harassment.'34 Rather than acknowledging that, from some students'
perspective, support for the football team is in direct opposition with a
movement to eliminate rape on campus, the Smith opinion incorporates the
worldview of students who do not think that campus institutions conventionally
characterized as apolitical should be analyzed as political. Under Smith,
students could form an organization such as a Yell Leaders Club, which uses
speech to support the football team. This group may not engage in obviously
political anti-feminist speech, but its unreflecting support of the football team
implicitly rejects the idea that the political issues of rape and sexual
harassment are linked to such programs. Because support of the football team
is not generally (or in Smith) considered political or ideological, these students
will be able to use mandatory activity fee funds to communicate, while
FAWOASH, a "political" group, will not. This differential treatment amounts
to the type of viewpoint-discrimination that led the R.A. V majority to hold that
a ban on hurtful "racist" fighting words was inherently viewpoint-based.
In the college campus context, groups that believe that campus life is
political frequently come into conflict with campus groups that believe that the
commonplaces of college life are apolitical. Campus debate often takes the
form of opposition between groups that oppose the status quo and are therefore
"political," and those that support the status quo and thus do not encourage
students to think about politics at all. To return to the example of the Gay and
Lesbian Student Union, plaintiffs have suggested that this group will be viewed
as "ideological," but neither side has suggested that student groups concerned
133. Justice Scalia argued that the ordinance would "license one side of a debate to fight freestyle,
while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules." R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
134. See supra note 131.
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with heterosexuality will also be considered "ideological." Moreover, even if
the University determined that a group concerned with homosexuality is no
more ideological than a group concerned with heterosexuality, the group
concerned with homosexuality will have far more reason to discuss politics
than will the heterosexual group. The group concerned with homosexuality
opposes the status quo, and part of such a stance means opposing legislation
specifically addressed at homosexual men and women.'35 The heterosexual
group does not face analogous political opposition, and thus has no
corresponding need to become politicized.
Professor Fiss urges looking at the impact of seemingly neutral criteria
used in making allocation decisions; the "ideal of neutrality in the speech
context not only requires that the state refrain from choosing among
viewpoints, but also that it not structure public discourse in such a way as to
favor one viewpoint over another. The state must act as a high-minded
parliamentarian, making certain that all viewpoints are fully and fairly
heard." 36 While the funding system ordered in Smith is neutral as between
progressive and conservative "political" student groups, it does discriminate
between groups that support and groups that oppose the status quo. Under
Smith, the speech of complacent mainstream groups will be subsidized, but not
that of their politicized opponents. This discrimination is viewpoint-based
because the government will support the speech of those with a mainstream
view of public issues while withholding support from those who challenge that
view. This dynamic returns us to the original argument that the Smith court
should have given more weight to the fact that the University was attempting
to support a diverse range of student speech when it decided whether funding
political student organizations was germane to the University's purpose:
Funding political groups was germane to the program's purpose-to support
a diversity of student speech-because a funding program which does not ban
applications from political student organizations is far more valuable to the
university in carrying out its mission to educate by supporting a campus forum
for debate.
135. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Gay Rights Advocates Brace for Ballot Fights, N.Y. TIWES, Jan. 12,
1994, at A17 (eight states may have ballot initiatives this year seeking to restrict rights of homosexual men
and women).
136. Fiss, supra note 89, at 2100. Cass Sunstein also notes that
the First Amendment has the structural goal of promoting a certain kind of deliberative
process.... if the government is permitted to obtain a number of enforceable waivers of the
free speech right [for example, waiver of the right to speak about political issues in exchange
for the benefit of a subsidy for speech], the aggregate effect may be substantial, and the
deliberative processes of the public will be skewed.
SUNsTEIN, supra note 103, at 115.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Because the Smith court failed to perceive the fee system as a means of
funding a public forum for student speech, a factor critical to the
constitutionality of the system, public forum doctrine had no bearing on the
decision. If one analyzes subsidized speech on university campus grounds in
light of the fact that the university is a public forum with respect to its
students, however, one can see that under the forced association doctrine,
content-neutral funding is not only permitted but required.
Prior to Smith, the mandatory fee system at U.C. Berkeley strove to allow
students' interests and convictions to guide what speech would be funded
within the forum. Students were free to form organizations and request funds
under content-neutral guidelines. Organizations could then use the funds to
advocate positions within the forum on behalf of their organization, not the
entire student body. This system not only avoided the constitutional evil of
compelling students to identify themselves personally with particular
viewpoints taken by various student organizations, but it also contributed to the
educational experience Berkeley sought to offer its students. 3 7 Undoubtedly
many public university students will view the Smith opinion as an invitation
to challenge mandatory fee systems within their own universities.138 This
Note has argued that courts faced with these challenges in the future should
incorporate a deeper appreciation than did the Smith court for the doctrine and
policy goals relating to support for speech within public fora, as well as the
tradition within higher education of actively encouraging free debate on
controversial public matters.
137. Recently, the importance of university provision for not merely tolerance of. student involvement
in public life has been emphasized by a national group studying what purposes higher education in the
United States should serve. For example, the group reported that it wanted "to stress that society's needs
will be well served if colleges and universities wholeheartedly commit themselves to providing students
with opportunities ... [for] first-hand experience, such as contributing to the well-being of others, [and]
participating in political campaigns." WINGSPREAD GROUP ON HIGHER EDUCATION, AN AMERICAN
IMPERATIVE: HIGHER EXPECTATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 10 (1993); see also id. at 66, 123.
138. The reasoning of Smith could be extended to use of student fees for any controversial expression
regarding public matters. One commentator argues that just as college students' associational interests are
infringed upon when a portion of their fees is used to fund political speech with which they disagree, law
school students' associational interests are infringed upon when their tuition or fees partially go toward
subsidizing loan forgiveness for students working at organizations that take political positions with which
some of the students disagree. Luize E. Zubrow, Is Loan Forgiveness Divine? Another View, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 451, 527-30 (1991).
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